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COMMENTS
NOW YOU SEE ME: PROBLEMS AND
STRATEGIES FOR INTRODUCING GENDER
SELF-DETERMINATION INTO THE
EIGHTH AMENDMENT FOR GENDER
NONCONFORMING PRISONERS
LIZZIE BRIGHT*
As the fight for transgender rights becomes more visible in the United
States, the plight of incarcerated transgender individuals seeking medical
care behind bars is likewise gaining attention—and some trans prisoners are
gaining access to gender-affirming care.
However, progress for
incarcerated members of the trans community has been slow, piecemeal, and
not without problems. As federal court opinions in Eighth Amendment
access-to-care cases brought by trans prisoners show, how a court interprets
the subjective intent requirements of the Eighth Amendment and how the
imprisoned plaintiff pleads his/her/their case can make or break the claim.
Further, courts and plaintiffs rely on medical diagnoses often couched in
fixed binary transition to make a cognizable constitutional claim for medical
care. For incarcerated gender nonconforming (“GNC”) individuals, the
established binary-based medical diagnoses increasingly accepted by courts
and prison officials may not reflect GNC individuals’ gender identities or
medical needs. However, utilizing updated medical standards that enable
patient gender self-determination in Eighth Amendment claims may extend
Eighth Amendment protection to GNC people in American prisons.
Deploying medical standards that are not aimed at binary transition in
Eighth Amendment litigation can provide an avenue for incarcerated GNC
individuals both to regain some power of gender self-determination and to

* A.B., University of Chicago, 2011; J.D. candidate, Northwestern University Pritzker School
of Law, 2018. Thanks to Laura for her unconditional love and support throughout this process.
Thanks to Steph and Annie for showing me there is a way to be gender nonconforming and
butch while rejecting toxic masculinity.
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ensure GNC prisoners have access to the gender-affirming medical care to
which they are entitled.
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INTRODUCTION
Americans have become more aware of issues facing the transgender
community in the past several years—Caitlyn Jenner’s “coming out,”
Laverne Cox’s role on Orange is the New Black, and Gavin Grimm’s case
challenging a school’s bathroom policy have all garnered national attention.1
Laverne Cox has spoken publicly about the plight of transwomen in prison,2
1
See, e.g., Moriah Balingit, Gavin Grimm just wanted to use the bathroom. He didn’t
think the nation would debate it., WASH. POST (Aug. 30, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/gavin-grimm-just-wanted-to-use-thebathroom-he-didnt-think-the-nation-would-debate-it/2016/08/30/23fc9892-6a26-11e6-ba325a4bf5aad4fa_story.html?utm_term=.ec2767706b40; Kathleen Parker, Opinion: Caitlyn
Jenner’s Coming Out, WASH. POST (June 2, 2015) https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
caitlyn-jenners-coming-out/2015/06/02/da17bb80-095f-11e5-95fd-d580f1c5d44e_story.
html?utm_term=.5f5b0cdbaef3; Jazz Jennings, The 100 Most Influential People: Laverne Cox,
TIME (Apr. 16, 2015), http://time.com/collection-post/3822970/laverne-cox-2015-time-100/.
2
See, e.g., Shannon Vestal Robson, Laverne Cox Gives a Hint About Sophia’s Season 4
Storyline on OITNB, POP SUGAR (Jan 19, 2016), http://www.popsugar.com/entertainment/
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and “[t]he issue of whether a transsexual3 person is entitled to hormone
therapy or sex-reassignment surgery while in prison has been litigated
extensively.”4 Yet, virtually no cases have been brought by prisoners seeking
gender-affirming5 care that is not aimed at fixed binary “male to female” or
“female to male” transition. Most problematically, even correctional6
facilities that do have protocols in place providing for medical care for
transgender inmates7 tend to use standards of care that cover only fixed
binary transition.8
In her article Feminism and the (Trans)gender Entrapment of Gender
Nonconforming Prisoners, Julia Oparah details the experiences of a gender
nonconforming (GNC) former prisoner, Bakari.9 Bakari, who identifies as
genderqueer,10 which to them means neither wholly male nor female, was
Laverne-Cox-Quote-About-Trans-Women-Prison-2016-39833058
(discussing
harsh
conditions transwomen face in prison, including solitary confinement).
3
Some courts and sources use the outdated term “transsexual” to mean transgender.
Where sources have used this word, I have left it in. I have also left in where sources use the
term “transgendered” rather that transgender.
4
Karen Moulding & National Lawyers Guild, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender
Committee, Access to Medical Treatment in Prison, in SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW §
10:26 (2016).
5
See Jae Puckett, Research Blog—Barriers to Gender-Affirming Care for Transgender
and Gender Non-conforming Individuals, IMPACT: THE LGBT HEALTH DEV. PROGRAM (Dec.
10, 2015), http://www.impactprogram.org/research-blog/research-blog-barriers-genderaffirming-care-transgender-gender-non-conforming-individuals/#sthash.GkJdfxmS.dpbs.
Gender-affirming care refers to a variety of medical treatments, including hormones and
surgery. Id.
6
I used this term as another word for “prison”—I do not believe prisons serve any
legitimate corrective or rehabilitative function.
7
I will periodically use the terms “prisoner” and “inmate” to describe people who are
incarcerated. This is meant only as shorthand, not as language intended to dehumanize the
overwhelming number of people incarcerated in the United States.
8
See, e.g., FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, MEDICAL MANAGEMENT OF TRANSGENDER INMATES
11 (Dec. 2016), available at https://www.bop.gov/resources/pdfs/trans_guide_dec_2016.pdf
(“Feminizing treatment is generally the more complex of the two gender-affirming regimens”
compared to masculinizing treatment) (emphasis added). The Federal Bureau of Prisons’
guide provides care guidelines only for male-to-female and female-to-male inmates—that is,
only for inmates seeking fixed binary transition. Id. at 11–19.
9
Julia C. Oparah, Feminism and the (Trans)gender Entrapment of Gender
Nonconforming Prisoners, 18 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 239, 239–40 (2012). “They/their” is
sometimes used as a singular pronoun by gender nonconforming and genderqueer individuals.
Id.
10
Genderqueer is often synonymous with gender nonconforming. See CTR. OF
EXCELLENCE FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, GUIDELINES FOR THE PRIMARY AND GENDERAFFIRMING CARE OF TRANSGENDER AND GENDER NONBINARY PEOPLE 15 (Madeline B.
Deutsch ed., 2d ed. 2016) (“Genderqueer is another term used by some with [the gender
nonconforming] range of identities”) [hereinafter “UCSF”]. For a discussion of specifically
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housed in a California prison according to their perceived biological sex.11
While “penal systems are premised on the existence of a rigid gender binary,”
Bakari asserted their “right to gender self-determination, including the right
to embrace a shifting and fluid gender identity.”12 People like Bakari exist in
this country’s many prisons, and they face high hurdles to receive the genderaffirming medical care they deserve as human beings.
Showing courts, which defer to medical expertise in their Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, that there are medical protocols inclusive of GNC
identities is a viable first step in this process of restoring gender selfdetermination to GNC prisoners. This Note will examine strategies and
barriers to getting GNC-competent medical protocols in front of courts, with
the goal of challenging the prevailing prison medical regime of fixed binarybased care and ultimately moving the law toward a self-determinative model
of gender identity.13
I. BACKGROUND
While locked up, Bakari observed higher levels of victimization of
gender nonconforming prisoners by staff, such as punishing individuals
within the “women’s” prison who grew facial hair.14 Prison abolition group
Black and Pink’s 2015 report likewise found that nearly 80% of trans and
gender nonconforming (“TGNC”) prisoners experienced emotional suffering
as a result of having to conceal their gender while locked up.15 The report
also found that over a third of TGNC individuals surveyed had used
hormones prior to being incarcerated, and 44% reported being denied
hormones once incarcerated.16 While the overall prevalence of TGNC
individuals in the U.S. may be low, this community is disproportionately
represented in America’s correctional system: almost one in six transgender
people in the U.S. has been locked up in a state or federal prison, and nearly
genderqueer identity, see LGBTQ+ Definitions, TRANS STUDENT EDUC. RES.,
http://www.transstudent.org/definitions (last visited June 9, 2017).
11
See Oparah, supra note 9, at 240.
12
Id.
13
For a brief examination of gender self-determination and the granting of discrete legal
rights to marginalized groups, see Eric A. Stanley, Gender Self-Determination, 1 TSQ:
TRANSGENDER STUD. Q. 19, 89 (2014).
14
See Oparah, supra note 9, at 241.
15
JASON LYDON ET AL., COMING OUT OF CONCRETE CLOSETS, BLACK & PINK 1, 4 (Oct. 21,
2015), http://www.blackandpink.org/wp-content/upLoads/Coming-Out-of-Concrete-Clos
ets.-Black-and-Pink.-October-21-2015.-Executive-Summary-and-Recommendations.pdf
(using the terms “transgender, nonbinary gender, and Two-Spirit” to describe TGNC
individuals).
16
See id.
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half of all black transgender Americans have been incarcerated.17 Forty-three
percent of the TGNC-identified individuals surveyed by Black and Pink had
a diagnosis of Gender Identity Disorder or Gender Dysphoria (“GID” or
“GD”), and nearly one-third of TGNC prisoners were denied a GID/GD
diagnosis when they sought one.18 One of these two diagnoses is typically
required before accessing gender-affirming care in prison.19 While it is
becoming more common for prisons to provide hormone therapy for some
transgender inmates and, for example, for prisons to allow transwomen to
wear feminine clothing in prison, access to surgery and care for all TGNC
people behind bars is far from the norm.20
It is vital to note that many of the transgender inmates seeking genderaffirming care in American prisons likely do identify within the binary—
meaning as men or women, and not as a non-binary gender(s).21 Their claims
and the courts’ binary-based responses might therefore accurately reflect
plaintiffs’ self-identification (though even after a hard-fought gendervalidating win in court, transgender inmates face heightened levels of

17

See Esinam Agbemenu, Medical Transgressions in America’s Prisons: Defending
Transgender Prisoners’ Access to Transition-Related Care, 30 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 1–
2 (2015). There is a high likelihood GNC prisoners are lumped into the “transgender” category
for prison statistics. “The broad category of transgender encompasses both pre and postoperative transgender individuals, genderqueer individuals, cross-dressers, the androgynous,
and other gender non-conforming people.” Id. at 9.
18
LYDON ET AL., supra note 15, at 4. GD has become the more accepted term, but because
some cases cited also use the term GID, I will use both terms in tandem. See Camille
Beredjick, DSM-V to Rename Gender Identity Disorder ‘Gender Dysphoria,’ THE
ADVOCATE (July 23, 2012, 7:00 PM), http://www.advocate.com/politics/transgender/2012/07/
23/dsm-replaces-gender-identity-disorder-gender-dysphoria.
19
See Agbemenu, supra note 17, at 2–3.
20
See Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d 228, 246 (D. Mass. 2012) (holding prison
officials violated the Eighth Amendment in denying care, including providing feminine
clothing that the plaintiff prisoner’s “medical providers indicated were necessary for her
treatment”); see also Moulding & National Lawyers Guild, supra note 4 (explaining that
hormone access is more available as a result of litigation but that access to surgery remains
inconsistent).
21
See Oparah, supra note 9, at 246–47 (“Although transgender and transsexual are not
synonyms, case law generally focuses on the experiences of male-to-female transsexuals” with
courts relying on binary-based GID diagnosis “[r]ather than challenging the gender binary.”).
All of this is not to say that transgender plaintiffs in any type of suit share a universal goal of
“passing” for a cisgender person—many are proud to be transgender. This Note also does not
seek to demean transgender individuals as lesser than GNC individuals, or even to artificially
divide the TGNC community into those who are transgender and those who are GNC, when
individuals may identify as both. Rather, this Note seeks to examine how courts and resulting
law may treat incarcerated individuals who seek gender-affirming care that is not necessarily
aimed at binary transition, and what challenges to binary care models are available.
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violence back in prison).22 In healthcare access just as in what has come to
be whitewashed as the “gay rights movement,” transgender individuals,
especially transwomen of color, are trailblazers.23 It is their claims of a right
to gender-affirming care that will continue to pave the way, now and in the
future, for care that is not couched in binary transition.
The case law surrounding transgender prisoners has focused mostly on
the experiences of transwomen.24 The reliance of courts on medical
diagnosis pathologizes transgender persons, granting them rights only when
they are defined as abnormal or sick.25 Excluded from legal protections are
those who do not seek diagnosis or medical care in relation to their gender
identity.26 Also excluded are those who do seek care but not with a goal of
permanent transition from one end of the binary to the other.27 For example,
a GNC person who seeks temporary hormone therapy to achieve certain
secondary sex characteristics but not others28 may be denied treatment under
the current diagnostic regime and may not have the sort of binary-based
evidence of medical need (for example, a constant lifelong desire to live as
“the opposite sex”29) currently relied on by courts in Eighth Amendment
22

LYDON ET AL., supra note 15, at 5 (e.g., LGBTQ survey respondents were six times
more likely to be sexually assaulted in prison than other inmates, and TGNC individuals are
targeted more severely than lesbian, gay, and bisexual inmates).
23
See Kamms, Never Forget #024: Transwomen of Color Kickstarted the Gay Rights
Movement (Stonewall), THE VISIBILITY PROJECT (May 26, 2016), http://www.thevisibility
project.com/2016/05/26/never-forget-transwomen-of-color-kickstarted-the-gay-rightsmovement-stonewall-uprising/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2016).
24
Oparah, supra note 9, at 246 (citing Darren Rosenblum, “Trapped” in Sing Sing:
Transgendered Prisoners Caught in the Gender Binarism, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 499, 522
(2000)). The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment enables
prisoners to sue for denial of medical care in prison. See generally Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97 (1976).
25
See Oparah, supra note 9, at 246–47; see generally Silpa Maruri, Hormone Therapy for
Inmates: A Metonym for Transgender Rights, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 807 (2011).
26
See Oparah, supra note 9, at 247. For example, an inmate may seek non-medical
interventions such as chest binding to express gender.
27
See Hannah Mogul-Adlin, Unanticipated: Healthcare Experiences of Gender
Nonbinary Patients and Suggestions for Inclusive Care, 5–7 (2015) (master’s thesis, Yale
School of Public Health), available at http://elischolar.library.yale.edu/ysphtdl/1197
(describing the medical profession’s conception of “transgenderedness” as based on
permanent binary transition from one sex to the “opposite sex”).
28
See FTM Testosterone Therapy Basics, HUDSON’S FTM RES. GUIDE, http://www.
ftmguide.org/ttherapybasics.html (last visited May 23, 2017). Only some effects of
testosterone—voice change and hair growth, for example—are permanent after a period of “t”
(testosterone) usage, while other effects, such as fat placement on the body, may revert to pret placement once hormone therapy is stopped. Id.
29
See, e.g., Rowe v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., No. 1:08-CV-827, 2010 WL 3779561, at *4
(W.D. Mich. Aug. 18, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:08CV827, 2010 WL
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litigation.
Numerous authors have tackled the issues arising from transgender
prisoners’ Eighth Amendment access to medical care claims from the lens of
pathology.30 Medical diagnosis reinforced by legal standards defines TGNC
individuals on terms set by doctors and courts—rather than allowing TGNC
individuals to define themselves.31 The end result is the perpetuation of
“simplistic binaries, which squeeze out anything or anyone that doesn’t fit”
but that are legible to mainstream society.32 What remains less discussed
than the pathologizing of transgender persons via binary-based medical
diagnosis is the elimination of gender fluidity and non-binary identities under
the current legal-medical regime. In particular, the current structure of
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence does not allow room for gender selfdetermination and instead emphasizes the subjective view of prison officials
and institutional medical opinion.33 GNC prisoners may be forced to bring
their Eighth Amendment denial of care claims in the mold of binarytransition-care claims instead of as GNC individuals. But newer GNCinclusive medical standards that enable patients to self-define their identities
already exist, and these standards are one way to undo the erasure of GNC
prisoners under the current Eighth Amendment denial-of-care regime.
Although the integration of these newer guidelines into the case law is a real
challenge for prisoners, a handful of cases demonstrate possible pitfalls and
paths to getting non-binary conceptions of gender in front of the courts.
The issue addressed in this Note—how to achieve gender self3779437 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 22, 2010) (finding no Eighth Amendment violation from prison
policy defining “gender identity disorders” as binary-based: “A person with a gender identity
disorder is unhappy with his/her biological sex, and desires to be considered a member of the
opposite sex.”).
30
See, e.g., Tara Dunnavant, Bye-Bye Binary: Transgender Prisoners and the Regulation
of Gender in the Law, 9 FED. CTS. L. REV. 15, 21 (2016) (discussing medical models of gender
that “pathologize gender transgression”); see also Franklin H. Romeo, Note, Beyond A
Medical Model: Advocating for A New Conception of Gender Identity in the Law, 36 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 713, 718 (2005) (describing the “medical model, in which gender
nonconformity is explained as a psychological condition most appropriately treated through
medical services”).
31
See Dunnavant, supra note 30 at 21–22. I use GNC to mean people within the greater
TGNC umbrella who do not necessarily define themselves as transgender but who identify as
gender nonconforming.
32
Id. at 22.
33
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 826 (1994) (reiterating that the Eighth Amendment
has a subjective prong requiring officials to be “aware” of risks to inmates); Fields v. Smith,
653 F.3d 550, 555 (7th Cir. 2011) (affirming district court finding of Eighth Amendment
violation where defendant prison officials, including medical staff, “knew of the serious
medical need but refused to provide hormone therapy” to transgender inmates) (emphasis
added).
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determination for TGNC prisoners by litigating standards of care not based
on a fixed gender binary—is but a tiny piece of the TGNC-equality puzzle.
Other authors have already noted that equal protection claims are often a
“losing strategy” for transgender plaintiffs because the Supreme Court
appears unwilling to expand those classifications receiving heightened
scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment.34 Equal Protection arguments
may not leave room for true gender self-determination beyond the binary if
Equal Protection is based on fixed “immutable” traits—though immutability
itself may not be sacrosanct in determining suspect classifications.35 The
criminalization of TGNC people—particularly of gender nonconforming
individuals36 and transwomen of color37—has far-reaching consequences that
necessitate multiple approaches. As with other intersecting marginalized and
surveilled communities, the effects of criminalization of TGNC individuals
impacts their access to housing, education, and employment.38 The very fact
that a body of case law exists dealing with access to gender-affirming care
for TGNC individuals behind bars is a symptom of the greater penalization
of the TGNC community.39 In order to dismantle the systemic oppression of
TGNC individuals, litigants and activists must deploy multiple strategies
inside and outside the courtroom—and always under the leadership of the
TGNC community. This Note is intended only to outline one possible—and
imperfect—route for moving toward self-determination for a subset of the
34

See Sarah Halbach, Comment, Framing A Narrative of Discrimination Under the
Eighth Amendment in the Context of Transgender Prisoner Health Care, 105 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 463, 471–72 (2015). Halbach notes that, in the employment context, courts are
becoming more willing to extend equal protection and Title VII protections to transgender
individuals. Id. at 473; see also Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2011)
(holding discrimination against transgender individuals is “sex-based discrimination that is
subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause”).
35
See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (finding the immutability of a
trait is a factor in the Equal Protection analysis); see also Chinyere Ezie, Deconstructing the
Body: Transgender and Intersex Identities and Sex Discrimination-the Need for Strict
Scrutiny, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 141, 180 (2011) (discussing the history and current place
of immutability in the Equal Protection framework).
36
Quick Guide to the Criminalization of Transgender and Gender Non-Conforming
People, TRANSFORMATIVE JUST. L. PROJECT OF ILL., https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/media/
publications/Guide%20to%20Criminalization%20of%20Trans%20%26%20Gender%20Non
Conforming%20People%20Transformative%20Justice%20Law%20Proj.%20of%20IL.pdf
(last visited Feb. 12, 2017).
37
Dina Kopansky, Locked Out: How the Disproportionate Criminalization of Trans
People Thwarts Equal Access to Federally Subsidized Housing, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 125, 137
(2014).
38
See id. at 126, 128.
39
See id. at 142 (explaining that the incarceration rate for transgender individuals is “far
higher than the incarceration rate for non-trans people”).
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TGNC community in the United States
II. STANDARDS OF CARE: CONVENTIONAL AND EMERGING MODELS
The medical model of gender, which utilizes psychiatric diagnosis of
Gender Identity Disorder/Gender Dysphoria (“GID”/“GD”) to legitimize
transgender status in the eyes of the law, can secure rights for transgender
individuals.40 But the currently dominant iteration of the medical model
“assumes that two genders exist and enforces the norms typically associated
with these genders.”41 The medical model has enabled access to rights and
protections, but at a cost: the binary gets reinforced, permanent transition
within two options is required, and GNC plaintiffs remain out in the cold.42
The medical model also “sets up the medical establishment as a gatekeeping
institution that regulates gender nonconformity and predicates legal rights on
access to health care,”43 all of which plays out in Eighth Amendment claims.
As will be explored in depth below, the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment44 applies when prisoners are denied
adequate medical care.45 To make a successful Section 198346 claim for a
violation of the Eighth Amendment based on, for example, the right to
adequate medical treatment, a prisoner must successfully allege both that the
need for medical care was serious47 and that the prison officials subjectively
knew of the need for care.48 Eighth Amendment cases involving deprivation
of medical care often turn on the medical opinions and expertise of prison
doctors.49 Like the Eighth Amendment requirement of subjective knowledge
and accompanying deference to medical opinion, officials and doctors are the
ones with the power to diagnose and define the imprisoned plaintiff’s gender
40

See Romeo, supra note 30, at 725.
Id. at 724–25.
42
Id. at 726–27.
43
Id. at 730.
44
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
45
See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
46
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). Section 1983 allows individuals to sue when the
government has violated a constitutional right. It is the statutory vehicle for prisoners to sue
prisons when prisons fail to meet Eighth Amendment standards of medical care and is
independent of the Eighth Amendment’s jurisprudential framework.
47
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.
48
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); see also De’Lonta v. Angelone
(De’Lonta I), 330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2003) (“[the Eighth Amendment] requires that a
prison official actually know of and disregard an objectively serious condition, medical need,
or risk of harm.”).
49
See, e.g., Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 88–89 (1st Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom.
Kosilek v. O’Brien, 135 S. Ct. 2059 (2015) (holding that the district court erred in part by
improperly “substituting its own beliefs for those of multiple medical experts”).
41
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under the traditional medical model.
A. GNC-INCLUSIVE MODELS OF CARE

The binary medical model is no longer the only model of care for TGNC
individuals. Professional literature that includes fluid and non-binary
genders exists. The American Psychological Association (“APA”) published
its Guidelines for Psychological Practice with Transgender and Gender
Nonconforming People in 2015.50 The APA Guidelines affirm that gender
identity may be non-binary and fluid.51 Likewise, the Center of Excellence
for Transgender Health at the University of California, San Francisco’s
Guidelines for the Primary and Gender-Affirming Care of Transgender and
Gender Nonbinary People (“UCSF Guidelines”) provide a model of
treatment for GNC individuals that accommodate fluid and non-binary
identities,52 such as providing lower doses of hormones for limited periods of
time rather than requiring permanent use of treatments that aim to transition
someone from one end of the binary to the other.53 The UCSF Guidelines
stress that the GNC patient’s identity should guide his/her/their own care and
that a GNC individual’s “authentic [gender] expression” may include
characteristics and treatments that others see as mismatched or not
identifiable as purely masculine or feminine.54 UCSF’s Guidelines take the
approach that individuals seeking gender-affirming care have “differing
desires for gender-affirming treatments.”55 Finally, the UCSF Guidelines
contrast their approach with the approach still holding sway in transgender
prisoner cases: “In contrast to past practices in which a set pathway involved
a requirement of psychological assessment → hormones → genital surgery,
the current standard of care is to allow each transgender person to seek only
those interventions which they desire to affirm their own gender identity.”56
B. FIXED BINARY MODELS OF CARE

Many prison systems in the U.S. now provide gender-affirming care for
at least some transgender inmates.57 The most recent edition of the
50

Am. Psychological Ass’n, Guidelines for Psychological Practice with Transgender and
Gender Nonconforming People, 70:9 AM. PSYCHOL. 832, 836, 862 (2015).
51
Id. at 836, 862.
52
See CTR. OF EXCELLENCE FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, supra note 10, at 15 (use of GNCinclusive terminology).
53
See id. at 70.
54
See id. at 70–71.
55
Id. at 17.
56
Id. at 23.
57
See Moulding & National Lawyers Guild, supra note 4.
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Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM-V”),
meanwhile, pays mere lip service to GNC individuals.58 The DSM-V, also
called the “psychiatrist’s bible,”59 is used in multiple correctional systems in
the United States60 and appears frequently in the case law dealing with TGNC
inmates.61 The DSM-V’s diagnostic scheme for gender dysphoria, which is
in widespread use in prisons, requires six months of feeling “marked
incongruence between one’s experienced/expressed gender and assigned
gender” and at least two of a menu of symptoms:
1.  A marked incongruence between one’s experienced/expressed gender and primary
and/or secondary sex characteristics (or in young adolescents, the anticipated
secondary sex characteristics).
2.  A strong desire to be rid of one’s primary and/or secondary sex characteristics
because of a marked incongruence with one’s experienced/expressed gender (or in
young adolescents, a desire to prevent the development of the anticipated
secondary sex characteristics).
3.  A strong desire for the primary and/or secondary sex characteristics of the other
gender.
4.  A strong desire to be of the other gender (or some alternative gender different from
one’s assigned gender).
5.  A strong desire to be treated as the other gender (or some alternative gender different
from one’s assigned gender).
6.  A strong conviction that one has the typical feelings and reactions of the other gender
62
(or some alternative gender different from one’s assigned gender).

The DSM-V’s first two diagnostic options assume one has to feel a

58

AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS § 302.85 (2013).
59
Lila Leonard, Gender Reassignment Surgery in Prisons: How the Eighth Amendment
Guarantees Medical Treatments Not Covered by Private Insurance or Medicare for LawAbiding Citizens, 11 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 626, 629–30 (2014) (citing Dana Beyer, The
End of Transgender as a Mental Illness, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 5, 2012, 9:34 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dana-beyer/theendof-transgender-as-a-mental-illness_b_
2238147.html).
60
See Thomas A. Fulks & Sonya Khilnani, Diagnosing Mental Illness: What Does the
DSM-5 Mean for Corrections?, CORRECTIONS (Oct. 13, 2014), http://www.corrections.com/
news/article/37711-diagnosing-mental-illness-what-does-the-dsm-5-mean-for-corrections-;
Ashley Hughes, Transgender Prisoners and the Law, 23 PRO SE 1, 1 (2013),
https://nebula.wsimg.com/36240e9309608e53e6b242b12d0201e1?AccessKeyId=58077DB5
116E2803DCE5&disposition=0&alloworigin=1 (describing the DSM-V in the transgender
prisoner context as “the manual medical professionals use to classify mental health
conditions”).
61
See, e.g., Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 550 (7th Cir. 2011).
62
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 58, at § 302.85.
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mismatch between, for example, one’s breasts and one’s gender identity to
get the benefits of a gender dysphoria diagnosis, when, as the UCSF report
points out, one can have both “breasts and facial hair as part of authentic
expression.”63 Item Three assumes there is some defined static “other
gender,” while items Four and Five presuppose a defined, implicitly opposite
“other gender” with “alternative gender”64 tacked on. Item Six presupposes
that there are “typical feelings and reactions”65 of one’s desired gender
identity, which flies in the face of gender as a fluid and self-determined—
rather than a cookie cutter two-sizes-fit-all—identity. In 2012, the DSM-V
did change its terminology from GID to GD in an effort to better capture
GNC individuals, with one member of the American Psychiatric Association
admitting “there is a whole community of people out there who . . . live
between the two binary categories.”66 Though the DSM-V moved further
“away from the gender binary, making the condition more inclusive for those
people who do not fit neatly into one gender category,”67 serious issues with
its diagnostic criteria remain—particularly in terms of gender fluidity and
acknowledging that some people identify with what could be called “mixed
sex characteristics.”68 Even the World Professional Association of
Transgender Health’s (“WPATH”) newest standards of care (also used by
prisons and thus by courts) have a hierarchy of identity: “[a]ccording to
WPATH, although nonconformity to gender roles is common, it does not
always rise to the level of gender dysphoria.”69 Many GNC individuals just
do not meet the requirements of GID/GD as set out by the widely-used DSMV or WPATH.70
C. MODELS OF CARE AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT

The Eighth Amendment and, thus, “the Constitution require
individualized assessment by medical providers, rather than decision-making

63

UCSF, supra note 10, at 71.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 58, at § 302.85.
65
Id.
66
Beredjick, supra note 18.
67
Halbach, supra note 34, at 481.
68
Id.
69
Dunnavant, supra note 30, at 25. WPATH also acknowledges that care should be
“individualized,” but courts may use this as a means to deny the need for surgery, as the
Kosilek en banc court did. WPATH’s Standards of Care are not widely accessible to the
public, though downloads are available for a fee of $45.00. See Standards of Care – Historical
Compilation of Versions 1–6, WPATH, http://www.wpath.org/site_store_product.cfm?store_
product=38&display_category=0 (last visited Oct. 25, 2017).
70
See Romeo, supra note 30, at 731.
64
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by administrators to bar entire classes of treatment.”71 Medical providers and
the medical protocols they rely on decide who has a valid Eighth Amendment
claim in front of the court.72 Indeed, “[w]ithout a clear diagnosis of gender
dysphoria, it may be challenging to convince a court of the urgency of the
individual’s medical need,” and thus, an Eighth Amendment claim will
always fail.73 The medical and psychological literature, even the DSM-V
with its parenthetical attempts to include GNC individuals, is moving toward
recognizing gender as non-binary and fluid.74 Yet courts, through the binarybased medical literature still in common use, remain dependent on static and
binary notions of gender to assess the claims of transgender prisoners seeking
care, using fixed binary language and evidence to validate gender identity in
a way that excludes GNC persons while establishing rights to care for some
transgender persons seeking fixed binary transition. Court reliance on such
increasingly outdated conceptions of gender75 plays into both the Eighth
Amendment’s requirement of subjective knowledge on the part of officials
tasked with providing care to inmates and the diagnoses meeting the
objective requirement. Depending on how courts construct the subjective
prong of the Eighth Amendment—the requirement that prison officials or
medical staff know what the inmate’s medical need is—there is more or less
room for newer GNC-inclusive medical opinions to influence courts. For
example, the more a court evaluates the subjective intent of an official sued
under the Eighth Amendment through a reasonableness lens, the more room
there is for a new medical opinion. The more a court abdicates its inferential
71

Moulding & National Lawyers Guild, supra note 4, at § 10:26.
See, e.g., Fields v. Smith, 712 F. Supp. 2d 830, 855–56 (E.D. Wis. 2010), supplemented
(July 9, 2010), aff’d, 653 F.3d 550 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Estate of Cole by Pardue v. Fromm,
94 F.3d 254, 261–62 (7th Cir. 1996)) (explaining that the Eighth Amendment requires
“medical treatment” to be far outside of conventional standards for a claim to succeed). What
care medical staff provides and how that care measures up to the medical profession’s own
standards makes or breaks an Eighth Amendment argument: “deliberate indifference may be
inferred based upon a medical professional’s erroneous treatment decision only when the
medical professional’s decision is such a substantial departure from accepted professional
judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible did not base the
decision on such a judgment.” Id.
73
Moulding & National Lawyers Guild, supra note 4, at § 10:26.
74
See Halbach, supra note 34 at 481.
75
See, e.g., Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 73, 78, 88–89 (1st Cir. 2014) (emphasizing
the need for GID patients to have “real-life experience” in a “cross gender role”). The prison
officials’ language is taken up by the court, and “real-life experience” based on “family” and
“social relationships” suggests living as a widely discernible, binary gender, while the
language of “cross-gender” roles sounds like transition from one end of the binary to another,
rather than allowing for a fluid gender identity. Id. Ultimately, the Kosilek court decided there
is “no support for the district court’s conclusion that no reasonable medical expert could opine
that [Michelle] Kosilek lacked real-life experience.” Id. at 88.
72
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power to objectively evaluate subjective knowledge of care options, the less
room there is for new medical opinions. UCSF-type standards of care may
enter the picture depending on how educated on TGNC inmates an official
must be in order to claim that his response to an inmate’s needs was
reasonable. The differing approaches courts take to evaluate official
knowledge and granting deference to prison medical staff can determine how
willing a court is to let standards other than the DSM-V, WPATH, or a
prison’s own guidelines into their opinions.
Medical theories of gender are not perfect—they pathologize and
disempower individuals who are forced to seek medicine to validate their
humanity in the eyes of the law—but there are more inclusive standards of
care available that can make room for gender self-determination behind
prison walls. Such inclusive medical standards will get litigated under the
Eighth Amendment.76
III. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT: LOOKING AT EVERYONE EXCEPT THE
PRISONER
A. THE BASIC FRAMEWORK: SERIOUS MEDICAL NEED AND
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Trans and gender nonconforming people are overrepresented in prison
populations,77 and their attempts to get adequate care are governed by the
Eighth Amendment.78 In Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme Court decided that,
in denial of medical care cases, “deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain’ . . . proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.”79 This standard applies to
doctors providing the care and other officials denying or delaying access to
medical services—though it does not apply to accidents.80 Some level of
intent is required of the bad actors.81 In Farmer v. Brennan, a case that
76
See Dan Manville, Federal Legal Standards for Prison Medical Care, PRISON LEGAL
NEWS (May 15, 2003) https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2003/may/15/federal-legalstandards-for-prison-medical-care/ (giving an overview of Eighth Amendment prison medical
care litigation).
77
See Romeo, supra note 30, at 714–15.
78
See Leonard, supra note 59, at 642 (“[T]he [Fields] court held that ‘[p]rison officials
violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment when they
display deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.’”) (citing Fields v. Smith,
653 F.3d 550, 554 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted)).
79
429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (internal citation omitted).
80
Id. at 104–06.
81
See id. at 116 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[B]y its repeated references to ‘deliberate
indifference’ and the ‘intentional’ denial of adequate medical care, I believe the Court
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notably dealt with violence against a transwoman that her jailers failed to
prevent, the Supreme Court readdressed the issue of denial of care and built
upon the reasoning of Estelle.82 In Farmer, the Court declined to adopt an
objective test for deliberate indifference, instead requiring the plaintiff
prisoner to show that the prison official had actual knowledge of the risk at
hand:
. . . [A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying
an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware
of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
83
exists, and he must also draw the inference.

Estelle and Farmer set out a daunting task for prisoners seeking to make
Eighth Amendment denial of care claims: 1) the medical need must be serious
(objective), 2) the actions of the prison officials in denying care must be
intentional (subjective), 3) those officials must know the facts giving rise to
the risk (subjective), 4) the officials must then connect those facts to the risk
(subjective), and 5) the officials must not have taken reasonable action to
lessen the risk of harm (subjective, in that reasonableness is judged in light
of official knowledge of the risk).84
Medical diagnoses serve two functions under this Eighth Amendment
framework. First, they meet the objective prong to show that the medical
need of the prisoner was serious.85 Second, an official’s knowledge of such
improperly attaches significance to the subjective motivation of the defendant as a criterion
for determining whether cruel and unusual punishment has been inflicted.”). The Estelle
majority is careful to skirt an intent requirement, stating that the Eighth Amendment is violated
when “the indifference is manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner’s needs
or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care . . . .” Id. at
104–05. The exclusion of “accidents” and “inadvertent” denials of care by prison staff makes
intent a practical necessity for Eighth Amendment claims. See id. at 105–06. The intent
requirement became more robust in Wilson v. Seiter, a conditions of confinement case: “The
source of the intent requirement is not the predilections of this Court, but the Eighth
Amendment itself, which bans only cruel and unusual punishment. If the pain inflicted is not
formally meted out as punishment by the statute or the sentencing judge, some mental element
must be attributed to the inflicting officer before it can qualify.” 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991).
82
511 U.S. 825, 828–29, 835 (1994) (“This case requires us to define the term ‘deliberate
indifference [first set out in Estelle v. Gamble],’ as we do by requiring a showing that the
official was subjectively aware of the risk.”).
83
Id. at 837.
84
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104–06. For a concise delineation of the
Eighth Amendment’s subjective and objective framework in the caselaw, see De’Lonta v.
Angelone (De’Lonta I), 330 F.3d 630, 633–34 (4th Cir. 2003).
85
See Dunnavant, supra note 30, at 29. At least in the First Circuit, plaintiffs can also
show a serious medical need when it is “so obvious that even a lay person would easily
recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Mahan v. Plymouth Cty. House of Corr., 64
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a diagnosis can meet the subjective prong by showing an official was aware
of and then deliberately indifferent to the prisoner’s need for care.86
Important to the possibilities for the proposed solution of introducing GNCinclusive care standards, the “responded reasonably to the risk”87 defense for
officials may give them room to choose what care is adequate to meet a
GID/GD diagnosis—or not.
The Eighth Amendment has a particular relationship to medicine, and
TGNC prisoners bringing claims under it rely on medical definitions of
gender identity to meet the Eighth Amendment’s intricate obstacle course of
requirements for liability.88 Not surprisingly, courts defer to medical
expertise in determining what counts as a serious medical need and what
constitutes deliberate indifference to the need.
B. DEFERENCE TO MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE

The Eighth Amendment’s two prong test relies heavily on medical
expertise—objectively by looking for institutional medical opinion of when
gender identity deserves treatment through diagnosis, and subjectively
through prison officials’ knowledge of the prisoners’ identities and care
options. While prison officials and medical staff have latitude89 in
diagnosing and treating GID/GD, state legislatures setting limits on genderaffirming care for transgender inmates may not be treated so kindly by courts.
In the landmark trans rights case Fields v. Smith, the Seventh Circuit struck
down Wisconsin’s ban on providing hormone therapy for transgender
F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 1995). Whether a lay person will identify the need of a transgender
person, never mind a potentially even more foreign-seeming GNC person, as in need of gender
affirming care is debatable and worthy of much more research.
86
See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842 (“Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge
of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including
inference from circumstantial evidence.”) (emphasis added). Farmer adds that if “the
circumstances suggest that the defendant-official being sued had been exposed to information
concerning the risk and thus ‘must have known’ about it, then such evidence could be
sufficient to permit a trier of fact to find that the defendant-official had actual knowledge of
the risk.”). Id. at 842–43. But this is not the same as a lower should-have-known standard;
such a should-have-known “inference cannot be conclusive, for we know that people are not
always conscious of what reasonable people would be conscious of.” Id. at 842 (internal
quotations omitted). Ultimately, Farmer makes clear “prison officials who lacked knowledge
of a risk cannot be said to have inflicted punishment.” Id. at 844.
87
Id. at 844.
88
See Halbach, supra note 34, at 479. Halbach’s article also provides a useful discussion
of the various critiques of the medical model’s ways of defining gender identity.
89
See, e.g., Rowe v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., No. 1:08-CV-827, 2010 WL 3779561, at *7
(W.D. Mich. Aug. 18, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:08CV827, 2010 WL
3779437 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 22, 2010). The leeway prison officials have to make care
decisions for inmates is discussed in depth below.
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prisoners as a violation of the Eighth Amendment.90 The Seventh Circuit
found that because the defendants failed to proffer evidence that alternative
treatments for GID/GD were effective, the blanket ban on hormone therapy
did not “constitutionally limit the discretion of physicians,”91 but instead
eliminated the discretion of these physicians and thus constituted cruel and
unusual punishment92—reiterating the primacy of medical standards to which
prison officials are held. The Fields court distinguished Wisconsin’s ban on
hormone therapy for prisoners from the so-called partial birth abortion ban
upheld by the Supreme Court in Gonzalez v. Carhart, which prevents doctors
from performing certain abortion procedures: “Carhart is not helpful to
defendants in this case because they did not present any medical evidence
that alternative treatments for GID are effective.”93 Importantly, the Supreme
Court upheld the ban in Carhart in part because the “Court has given state
and federal legislatures wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where
there is medical and scientific uncertainty.”94 The implication is that medical
expertise has the power to restore legislative authority to outlaw certain
treatments, even in the face of constitutional challenges like those posed by
prisoners seeking adequate medical care. It is not surprising then that
multiple transgender prisoner cases turn on the medical expertise of prison
officials.
The First Circuit’s decision in Kosilek v. Spencer, which overturned a
district court order requiring the Massachusetts Department of Corrections
(“DOC”) to provide gender-affirming surgery to a transwoman, lambasts the
district court for “substituting its own beliefs for those of multiple medical
experts” in its order to the DOC.95 In the First Circuit, adequate medical care
for Eighth Amendment purposes is defined as care “measured against
‘prudent professional standards.’”96 The District Court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin, affirmed by the Seventh Circuit in Fields, likewise
held “deliberate indifference may be inferred ‘when the medical
professional’s decision is such a substantial departure from accepted
professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the
90

Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 559 (7th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 556–57.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 557.
94
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007).
95
774 F.3d 63, 88–89 (1st Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Kosilek v. O’Brien, 135 S.
Ct. 2059 (2015).
96
Nunes v. Mass. Dep’t of Correction, 766 F.3d 136, 142 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing United
States v. DeCologero, 821 F.2d 39, 43 (1st Cir. 1987)). DeCologero defined care within
medical standards as “services at a level reasonably commensurate with modern medical
science.” 821 F.2d at 43. Care approaching the medical norm is adequate.
91
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person responsible did not base the decision on such a judgment.’”97
Violation of the Eighth Amendment is in large part determined based on the
care standards used by doctors treating prisoners.98 In Rowe v. Correctional
Medical Services Inc., where a transwoman’s attempt to get an injunction
enabling her access to hormones, a bra, and outside medical opinion was
denied, the court reiterated judicial deference to medical expertise in Eighth
Amendment denial of care cases: “where the prisoner is receiving treatment
with the dosage levels based on the considered professional judgment of a
physician, this court is reluctant to second-guess that judgment.”99 In Rowe,
the court further stated: “[t]he Sixth Circuit has never required the trial court
to substitute its judgment for that of the medical providers who treat the
transsexuals on a day-to-day basis.”100
This deference to medical expertise presents obstacles to the prisoner
seeking to base his/her/their claim on a less binary-focused medical standard:
treatment based on medical standards, no matter how backward and binary,
may negate an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim.101 In
Kothmann v. Rosario, however, the Eleventh Circuit denied a motion to
dismiss brought by the Chief Health Officer (“CHO”) of the Florida
Department of Corrections when transman Sebastian Kothmann was denied
gender-affirming care (testosterone) and sued.102 The Kothmann court found
that the CHO’s awareness that Kothmann had GID, that Kothmann was
seeking hormone treatment for GID, and that “in the medical community,
hormone therapy is the medically recognized, accepted and appropriate
treatment for GID” were enough to meet the subjective test of the Eighth

97

Fields v. Smith, 712 F. Supp. 2d 830, 855–56 (E.D. Wis. 2010), supplemented (July 9,
2010), aff’d, 653 F.3d 550 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Estate of Cole by Pardue v. Fromm, 94 F.3d
254, 261–62 (7th Cir. 1996). Pardue noted, “deliberate indifference may be inferred based
upon a medical professional’s erroneous treatment decision only when the medical
professional’s decision is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment,
practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible did not base the decision
on such a judgment..” Pardue, 94 F.3d at 261–62.
98
Rowe v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., No. 1:08-CV-827, 2010 WL 3779561, at *6 (W.D.
Mich. Aug. 18, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:08CV827, 2010 WL
3779437 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 22, 2010) (“[W]here the prisoner is receiving treatment, the
dosage levels of which are based on the considered professional judgment of a physician,
courts are reluctant to second-guess the physician’s judgment.”).
99
Id. at *7.
100
Id. at *8.
101
See Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 108 (1st Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Kosilek
v. O’Brien, 135 S. Ct. 2059 (2015) (Thompson, J., dissenting) (discussing the Kosilek
majority’s allowance for the Massachusetts Department of Corrections to cherry pick medical
opinions on which to base care for trans prisoners).
102

558 F. App’x 907 (11th Cir. 2014).
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Amendment.103 Likewise, in De’Lonta v. Angelone, the Fourth Circuit
reversed a district court’s dismissal of a transgender prisoner’s Eighth
Amendment claim at summary judgement.104 The Fourth Circuit held that
“[i]n dismissing De’lonta’s suit, the district court incorrectly determined,
based on the limited record before it, that the suit was nothing more than a
challenge to the medical judgment of [Virginia Department of Corrections]
doctors.”105 Rather than assuming doctors base their decisions in medical
protocol and deferring accordingly, the Fourth Circuit questioned whether
the decision to deny De’Lonta care was based on medical opinion at all.106
Thus, deference to medical expertise does not necessarily give carte blanche
to prison medical staff to determine what constitutes appropriate treatment.
Deference to medical expertise is a double-edged sword under the
Eighth Amendment: medical expertise can strip prisoners of their power to
self-determine their gender, reinforce the binary, and preclude court
examination of treatment regimens, but it also provides an avenue whereby
new conceptions of gender identity can be recognized under the law and old
binary standards may be challenged.107
Current medical provider
competency in caring for transgender and GNC patients—in and outside the
penitentiary—is not perfect even for endocrinologists who prescribe
hormones.108 However, with more medical professionals seeking and
accessing training in caring for TGNC patients,109 the Eighth Amendment’s
deference to medical knowledge could prove a powerful tool for GNC
inmates seeking non-binary care while locked up. Of course, medical
education must continue expanding the training all providers receive
regarding care for the TGNC community.110 Getting more prisoner103

Kothmann v. Rosario, 558 F. App’x 907, 911 (11th Cir. 2014).
330 F.3d 630, 631 (4th Cir. 2003). Note that the courts involved in Ophelia De’Lonta’s
multiple suits against Virginia prison officials alternatively spell her name De’lonta and
De’Lonta.
105
Id. at 634.
106
Id. at 635.
107
Diagnosis also may depoliticize GID/GD cases, easing pressure on prison officials to
deny treatments that members of the public may not want their tax money paying for. See
Halbach, supra note 34, at 487. “The [District of Massachusetts in Michelle Kosilek’s 2002
case regarding hormones] warned, however, that if the []DOC Commissioner were to base his
decision on concerns about cost or political controversy, he would violate the Eighth
Amendment.” Id.
108
See Anna Almendrala, Doctors Want to Learn More About Treating Transgender
Patients, Survey Shows, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 11, 7017, 8:18 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/promising-doctors-survey-reveal-positive-attitudetoward-transgender-patients_us_5876a220e4b05b7a465d9fa4.
109
See id.
110
See generally Jordan Aiken, Promoting an Integrated Approach to Ensuring Access to
104

BRIGHT

156

1/27/18 2:30 PM

BRIGHT

[Vol. 108

empowering standards of care in front of courts that will accept such
expertise is the key to a litigation-based solution that utilizes the growing
TGNC-competence of medicine.
IV. CASE LAW: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR GNC PLAINTIFFS
Eighth Amendment claims regarding gender-affirming care have thus
far been brought by transgender-identified prisoners.111 It is those cases that
illustrate the interplay between the Eighth Amendment’s subjective and
objective standards and courts’ reliance on a binary medical-legal conception
of gender. Some cases provide openings for GNC-inclusive standards of
care, whereas others do not.112
A. CHALLENGES: WHEN COURTS LET PRISONS USE THEIR OWN
PROBLEMATIC EXPERTS AND POLICIES TO (MIS)TREAT INMATES

While the First Circuit in Kosilek noted that “GID is a serious medical
need, and one which mandates treatment, [and that issue] is not in dispute in
this case,” it nonetheless found that the Eighth Amendment does not mandate
surgery with a diagnosis of GID.113 Kosilek held, “[t]he choice of a medical
option that, although disfavored by some in the field, is presented by
competent professionals does not exhibit a level of inattention or callousness
to a prisoner’s needs rising to a constitutional violation.”114 At first, the
court’s reasoning here seems to give weight to alternative medical views of
gender, perhaps alternatives to the binary of the DSM-V as laid out by courts
that favor newer medical guidelines that take account of GNC identities.
However, differing interpretations of one standard of care (which had a fixed
Gender Incongruent Health Care, 31 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 1 (2016).
111
See Oparah, supra note 9, at 246 (citing Darren Rosenblum, “Trapped” in Sing Sing:
Transgendered Prisoners Caught in the Gender Binarism, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 499, 512
(2000)).
112
See, e.g., Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 92 (1st Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom.
Kosilek v. O’Brien, 135 S. Ct. 2059 (2015) (holding courts “do not sit to substitute [their] own
judgment for that of prison administrators” when prison administrators make decisions
regarding health care regimens and security measures). But see Kothmann v. Rosario, 558 F.
App’x 907, 910 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that a prison official would not be liable for an
Eighth Amendment violation if she could “establish that Kothmann ‘received adequate mental
health treatment for his GID’” rather than just for the symptoms the prison treated him for)
(citing Kothmann v. Rosario, No. 5:13-CV-28-OC-22PRL, 2013 WL 12096653, at *5 (M.D.
Fla. June 6, 2013), aff’d, 558 F. App’x 907 (11th Cir. 2014)) (emphasis in circuit and district
court opinions).
113
Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 86. The Kosilek court acknowledged that the DSM-V terminology
changed from GID to gender dysphoria but kept using GID because it was the term used
throughout most of the case’s lengthy litigation history. Id at 68 n.1.
114
Id. at 91–92.
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binary “real life experience” requirement) is one of the grounds on which the
First Circuit reversed the district court:
We find no support for the district court’s conclusion that no reasonable medical expert
could opine that Kosilek lacked real-life experience, particularly in light of the contrary
testimony from medical experts concerning the range of social, environmental, and
professional considerations that are necessary to constitute a real-life experience under
115
the Standards of Care.

The First Circuit also found fault with what it characterized as the
district court “ignor[ing] significant contrary evidence regarding the breadth
and variety of acceptable treatments for GID within the medical
community.”116 In Kosilek, multiple possible methods of caring for TNGC
prisoners allows for denial of care.117 Under the Kosilek framework there is
not subjective deliberate indifference if the denial is based on some medical
opinion, even the most restrictive among other options. This is the Eighth
Amendment’s reasonable risk prevention liability shield at its most extreme,
with no evaluation of what is reasonable beyond that the prison officials
sought some form of medical expertise to justify the lack of care provided to
Michelle Kosilek.118
The First Circuit refuses to read objective reasonableness into the
subjective prong: “[m]oreover, a later court decision—ruling that the prison
administrators were wrong in their estimation of the treatment’s
reasonableness—does not somehow convert that choice into one exhibiting
the sort of obstinacy and disregard required to find deliberate
indifference.”119 In Kosilek, a strong subjective Eighth Amendment prong
requires a higher showing of official state of mind from the plaintiff.
Combined with a low threshold for what counts as medical expertise, this
approach resulted in the denial of care to an incarcerated transwoman.
Rowe v. Correctional Medical Services, like Kosilek, held that a
prisoner’s treatment regime is up to prison medical staff to decide—not for
the prisoner to have a say in beyond requesting medical care.120 Rowe relied
115

Id. at 88.
Id. at 89.
117
See id. at 82–83 (citing Ferranti v. Moran, 618 F.2d 888, 891 (1st Cir. 1980) (The
subjective prong of the Eighth Amendment “does not impose upon prison administrators a
duty to provide care that is ideal, or of the prisoner’s choosing” and Eighth Amendment claims
that “‘simply reflect a disagreement on the appropriate course of treatment . . . fall[ ] short of
alleging a constitutional violation.’”).
118
See id. at 91–92 (citing precedent indicating deliberate indifference is not met when
the dispute centers not on the absence of treatment but the choice of a course of treatment).
119
Id at 92.
120
See No. 1:08-CV-827, 2010 WL 3779561, at *8, *9 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 18, 2010),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:08CV827, 2010 WL 3779437 (W.D. Mich. Sept.
116

BRIGHT

158

1/27/18 2:30 PM

BRIGHT

[Vol. 108

on Michigan Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) policies that were
explicitly binary.121 The MDOC policies stated, “[a] person with a gender
identity disorder is unhappy with his/her biological sex, and desires to be
considered a member of the opposite sex” and “has a longstanding desire to
replace his or her own physical sexual characteristics . . . with those of the
opposite sex.”122 Rowe is adamant in its deference to internal prison policies
regarding GID treatment over external and established medical expertise,
even under a standard of review that is meant to be deferential to the plaintiff
trying to fight the defendant officials’ motion for summary judgment.123 The
Rowe court adds, “the court is not bound to blindly adopt a non-moving
party’s version of the facts.”124 Note that this is a departure from the approach
taken toward summary judgment in De’Lonta I discussed above and
below.125 The court assumes the MDOC policy is “sound medical judgment”:
“the [15-month] delay in authorizing hormone therapy treatment was based
on the sound exercise of medical judgment, as set forth in the Policy
Directive.”126 In denying the prisoner’s request to have an outside medical
evaluation done regarding her GID, the court notes, “plaintiff disagrees with
the prescribed course of treatment as a transsexual” and gives the plaintiff’s
view no weight.127 The Rowe opinion ultimately held that the “plaintiff has
no cause of action under the Eighth Amendment to require a specific
treatment, such as the requested hormone therapy or a bra.”128 Rowe refused
to examine the adequacy of care—one means of questioning the standards of
care prisons are using—under the Eighth Amendment, essentially finding

22, 2010) (citing Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir.1976)) (noting federal
courts “are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments” made by prison staff and
that the “plaintiff has no cause of action under the Eighth Amendment to require a specific
treatment, such as the requested hormone therapy . . .”).
121
Id. at *4.
122
Id.
123
Id. at *3 (citing McLean v. 988011 Ontario Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000))
(“‘In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court views the factual evidence and draws
all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.’”).
124
Id.
125
See De’Lonta v. Angelone (De’Lonta I), 330 F.3d 630, 633 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing
Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 2002) (“‘A complaint should not be dismissed . . .
unless after accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint as true and
drawing all reasonable factual inferences from those facts in the plaintiff’s favor, it appears
certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim entitling him to
relief.’”) (emphasis added)). The difference in each court’s acceptance level of the plaintiff’s
version of the facts in Rowe and De’Lonta I pushes toward opposite results in each case.
126
Rowe, 2010 WL 3779561, at *6.
127
Id. at *9.
128
Id.
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that some level of treatment is automatically enough to bar deliberate
indifference: “[a]s a general rule, ‘[w]here a prisoner has received some
medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment,
federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and
to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.’”129 Attacking
prison policies directly is not a winning strategy under Rowe: because
“MDOC physicians undertook testing and examinations before authorizing
the hormone therapy consistent with the requirements of Policy Directive,”
they are not liable for deliberate indifference during the over one-year period
when the plaintiff did not receive hormones.130 The Rowe court emphasizes
the prison’s policy rather than the harm caused to the plaintiff or the adequacy
of the knowledge of the defendant officials.
As Judge Thompson’s dissent concludes, the Kolisek majority “enables
correctional systems to further postpone their adjustment to the crumbling
gender binary.”131 When courts enable wide prison discretion over choice of
care for inmates, a prison doctor can select a treatment plan that does not fit
an inmate’s needs as long as long as it is based on some “competent” medical
opinion, no matter how much other experts disagree with that opinion.132
Kosilek’s and Rowe’s use of established binary-based conceptions of gender
in GID diagnoses foreclose treatment of GNC inmates as the inmates
themselves conceive of it and as emerging medical experts acknowledge.
Thompson’s scathing dissent spells out the implications: the majority
“gives correctional departments serious leeway with the Eighth Amendment.
If they do not want to provide a prisoner with care recommended by one or
more than one medical provider, they need only find a doctor with a differing
mind set (typically not a difficult task).”133 But there are bright spots—other
courts’ Eighth Amendment jurisprudence pokes holes in prison officials’
power to deny care for TGNC inmates.

129

Id. at *8 (internal citations omitted). The “some” treatment standard of Rowe also
seems to conflict with the individualized care requirement of the Eighth Amendment. See,
e.g., Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 91 (1st Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Kosilek v.
O’Brien, 135 S. Ct. 2059 (2015) (mentioning “the requirement that medical care be
individualized based on a particular prisoner’s serious medical needs”).
130
Rowe, 2010 WL 3779561, at *7.
131
Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 113 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
132
See Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 91–92 (“The choice of a medical option that, although
disfavored by some in the field, is presented by competent professionals does not exhibit a
level of inattention or callousness to a prisoner’s needs rising to a constitutional violation.”).
133
Id. at 108.
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B. OPPORTUNITIES: SHIFTING SUBJECTIVITY AND REFOCUSING ON
THE PRISONER

In Kothmann v. Rosario, the court softened the Eighth Amendment’s
subjective prong where Kosilek hardened it. Kothmann’s attribution of
subjective knowledge to the Chief Health Officer (Rosario) based on the
existence of a recommended GID treatment pushes the limits of Farmer’s
clarification that circumstantial evidence can be used to “suggest that the
defendant-official being sued had been exposed to information concerning
the risk and thus ‘must have known’ about it,” enabling the trier of fact to
infer actual subjective knowledge.134 Reviewing the district court ruling de
novo but assuming the facts in Kothmann’s complaint to be true, the Eleventh
Circuit went the extra mile and stuck with the inference that it was possible
Rosario had actual knowledge certain treatment protocols were the required
(reasonable) way to treat Sebastian Kothmann, thereby slipping an objective
evaluation into their assessment of Rosario’s actions.135 Kothmann also
rejected Rosario’s argument that the treatment she provided—counseling—
was enough since “inmates are entitled to some form of treatment, but not
necessarily their preferred method.”136 The Eleventh Circuit found that
because the hormone treatment Kothmann sought was medically necessary,
Rosario had to provide it.137
The court’s assumption that Rosario was aware of what the care
guidelines for transgender inmates are softens the subjective prong of the
Eighth Amendment into something more akin to the objective approach
favored by Justice Stevens’s concurrence in Farmer: “a state official may
inflict cruel and unusual punishment without any improper subjective

134

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842–43 (1994).
Kothmann v. Rosario, 558 F. App’x 907, 911 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[W]e hold that
Kothmann has alleged facts sufficient to show that Rosario knew that hormone treatment was
the recognized, accepted, and medically necessary treatment for Kothmann’s GID, yet
knowingly refused Kothmann’s repeated requests for such treatment . . .”). Kothmann seems
to turn a defense available in Farmer on its head: while “prison officials who actually knew
of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they
responded reasonably to the risk,” by providing counseling for example, Kothmann says an
unreasonable response, such as providing only counseling, counts against an official. Harm
to the inmate is not the emphasis of Farmer’s reasonableness of response analysis, and thus
Farmer implicitly sets a lower bar for officials to meet than Kothmann: “In addition, prison
officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free
from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not
averted.” See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844.
136
Kothmann, 558 F. App’x at 911–12. In Kothmann, the treatment was “hormone
treatment . . . the accepted, medically necessary treatment for Kothmann’s GID.” Id. at 912.
137
See id.
135
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motivation.”138 The Kothmann court did not care if Rosario had an improper
subjective motive here; the court saw her departure from the standard GID
treatment as objectively unreasonable and her knowledge that the protocols
existed as enough subjective intent to meet the Eighth Amendment standard
of deliberate indifference.139
The bright spot in Kothmann, despite its reliance on binary diagnosis,140
is the framework it provides: the existence of a medical opinion that a course
of treatment is “medically necessary,” or even reasonable in the court’s eyes,
can work to override the subjective prong of the Eighth Amendment, at least
to get past a 12(b)(6) motion.141 Established-by-the-prison standards of care
and the subjective intent of the official (however backward)142 who plays
gatekeeper to care can be overcome by an objective reasonableness analysis,
which sneaks in under the Farmer allowance for courts to make an inference
of subjective knowledge based on surrounding facts.143
Like Kothmann, De’Lonta v. Angelone—the Fourth Circuit case that
reversed a district court’s grant of summary judgment against a transwoman
seeking hormones in prison—examines the decisions of medical personnel
with a grain of skepticism,144 leaving the door open for plaintiffs to challenge
the actual standards of care used by prisons. The Fourth Circuit rejected the
district court’s characterization of the case as “nothing more than a challenge
to the medical judgment of [prison] doctors” and thus outside the bounds of
the Eighth Amendment.145 Based upon memos between prison doctors and
the prison’s policy not to provide gender-affirming care to inmates, the
138

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 858 (Stevens, J., concurring on stare decisis grounds).
Kothmann, 558 F. App’x at 911 (“Rosario knew that hormone treatment was the
recognized, accepted, and medically necessary treatment for Kothmann’s GID, yet knowingly
refused Kothmann’s repeated requests for such treatment and thus was deliberately indifferent
to a serious medical need.”). Knowledge, not intent, drove the court’s analysis.
140
See id. at 909. The court looked at fixed identity to evaluate Kothmann’s diagnosis:
“[Kothmann] was diagnosed with GID in 2005 and, since that time, he has been under a
doctor’s care and has ‘regularly taken prescribed testosterone, except when [he] was prevented
from doing so by [his] incarceration.’” Id.
141
Id.
142
Id. at 908. According to Kothmann, Rosario “‘vetoed’ a prison doctor’s referral of
Kothmann to the endocrinology staff, who could prescribe hormone treatment, because
[Rosario believed] ‘endocrinology is not for cosmetic issues.’” Id.
143
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842 (“Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a
substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including
inference from circumstantial evidence.”).
144
See, e.g., 330 F.3d 630, 635 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding that one prison doctor’s denial of
care to De’Lonta “was based solely on the Policy rather than on a medical judgment
concerning De’lonta’s specific circumstances”).
145
Id. at 634.
139
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De’lonta I court inferred that the prison officials’ decision to deny care was
“based solely on the Policy rather than on a medical judgment concerning
De’lonta’s specific circumstances.”146 Such grounds for a medical decision
are inadequate because they are not medical opinion at all—medical
standards must be standards, not mere decisions that happen to be made by
medical staff.147 The court points out that “nothing in the record suggests
that [the defendant-official’s] opinion was a basis for the denial of De’lonta’s
requested treatment.”148 Rather than readily defer to the prison’s medical
staff, the De’Lonta I court scrutinized the care the prison provided by making
clear what was not in the record: “nothing in the record refutes the allegation
that Appellees know that De’lonta’s compulsive self-mutilation began after
the discontinuation of her hormone therapy.”149 The court continued:
“Moreover, Dr. Marsh’s memo is at most only a comment on the
appropriateness of one possible treatment and does not refute De’lonta’s
claim that she has not received any treatment to suppress her compulsion to
mutilate herself.”150 The Fourth Circuit was not willing to sustain the
dismissal of a trans prisoner’s claim by filling in the medical blanks, instead
requiring the defendant doctors to make clear the medical basis of their
decisions and defend their expertise via the record.151 The De’Lonta I court
even required the defendants to “demonstrate” for the limited treatment
De’Lonta received to purportedly alleviate her “compulsion” to self-harm
“that the treatment was provided for that purpose or that it was deemed to be
a reasonable method of preventing further mutilation.”152 The court
demanded that defendants show that their treatment plan was “reasonable”
rather than show that they subjectively thought it to be acceptable care153—
leaving room for a challenge based on newer, more GNC-friendly standards
of care. The court added that it “make[s] no comment on the type of
treatment, if any, to which D’lonta is entitled,”154 indicating that medical
146

Id. at 635.
See id. (emphasizing that medical opinion and not mere prison policy must be the basis
for care decisions).
148
Id. (emphasis added).
149
Id. at 634.
150
Id. at 635.
151
See id. (pointing out that “nothing in the record suggests that [prison physician] Dr.
Marsh’s opinion was a basis for the denial of De’lonta’s requested treatment” and that “policy”
took the place of “medical judgment” in treating De’Lonta) (emphasis added).
152
Id. (emphasis added).
153
Id. at 634–35 (agreeing with De’Lonta that her care “was abruptly terminated for no
legitimate reason” even though the prison provided evidence that doctors were involved in
De’Lonta’s case).
154
Id. at 636.
147

BRIGHT

2017]

1/27/18 2:30 PM

NOW YOU SEE ME

163

opinion retains power to turn the case. But the Fourth Circuit decision
punched out an opening for better medical opinion to get in front of the court
and set at least a higher bar prison that medical opinion must meet in showing
the reasonableness of the basis of the care prisons provide (or deny) to defeat
an Eighth Amendment suit. Because the Fourth Circuit demanded the prison
doctors show the medical support for their denial of care and the doctors
failed to do so, Ophelia De’Lonta’s Eighth Amendment claim survived
summary judgement.155 For Eighth Amendment plaintiffs appealing
dismissal at summary judgement, De’Lonta I provides a template for closer
court scrutiny of prison medical staff decisions to deny care.156
In Wolfe v. Horn, where a transwoman who had already been prescribed
hormones before she was incarcerated and was subsequently denied
hormones in prison, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that “abrupt
termination of prescribed hormonal treatments by a prison official with no
understanding of Wolfe’s condition, and failure to treat her severe
withdrawal symptoms or after-effects, could constitute ‘deliberate
indifference.’”157 Jessica Wolfe’s case suggests that medical knowledge of a
condition is necessary when care is denied or the denying official faces an
Eighth Amendment claim.158 More importantly, Wolfe, like Kothmann and
De’Lonta I, takes a step toward evaluating prison officials via objective
criteria, holding that “deliberate indifference” is “essentially a subjective
standard” but that “objective factors may inform the viability of a ‘deliberate
indifference’ claim.”159 Here, one of those factors was the fact that officials
without adequate knowledge of gender-affirming care were involved in
decision-making.160 This puts the onus on prison officials to allow only those
educated about the needs of transgender inmates to make decisions regarding
their care and gives prisons some motive to stay current on standards of care
that are more GNC-inclusive.
Norsworthy v. Beard provides a useful model for courts and litigants to
shrink the subjective shield the Eighth Amendment hands to defendants that
rely on their own binary-based medical standards in treating TGNC

155

Id. at 635–36.
See generally De’Lonta v. Angelone (De’Lonta I), 330 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2003).
157
130 F. Supp. 2d 648, 653 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
158
Id. Wolfe uses the Farmer v. Brennan allowance for an inference of knowledge,
pushing toward objective reasonableness and away from subjective intent prong of the Eighth
Amendment: “‘deliberate indifference’ is [a] fact question which may be demonstrated
through circumstantial evidence that risks were obvious.” Id. (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 842 (1994)).
159
Id. at 652 n.6.
160
Id. at 653.
156
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inmates.161 In Norsworthy, the court found that the plaintiff prisoner,
Michelle-Lael Bryanna Norsworthy, had stated an Eighth Amendment claim
for injunctive relief to receive gender-affirming surgery.162 The court
allowed her claim to move forward and let her question the extent of the
prison officials’ expertise in trans care: “The Court agrees with Norsworthy’s
contention that she should have the opportunity to explore the Defendants’
motives and the extent and nature of their knowledge through discovery.”163
It is key to the Norsworthy court’s Eighth Amendment analysis that the
plaintiff be able to question the standard of care used by officials:
“[d]efendant’s argument that Norsworthy’s medical indifference claim must
fail because she received some treatment for her gender dysphoria is also
unconvincing, as a prisoner need not prove that she was completely denied
medical care in order to prevail.”164 Norsworthy gets at the adequacy of the
care the prison provided in alleviating the prisoner’s medical problem, rather
than shrugging off the question of adequacy when the prisoner gets some
treatment, no matter how limited.165 This gives her an opportunity to attack
the prison’s treatment regimen itself and provides the opening to propose
better guidelines.166
Prison treatment plans are not invincible to Eighth Amendment attacks,
and Diamond v. Owens illustrates that a prisoner can challenge prison
policies that define and limit what counts as GID/GD worthy of medical

161

87 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1117 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
See id. at 1118 (holding that “[b]ecause there is no recommendation by a treating
physician or other medical provider against sex reassignment surgery, this is not a case in
which prison staff have simply reviewed and affirmed medical decisions made by others” and
thus that defense is unavailable to the defendant prison officials.). In other words, Norsthworth
does not let officials who denied care escape all liability based on the fact that no doctor
actively ordered care but instead places a burden on prison staff to justify what they did based
on medical opinion. See also Wolfe v. Horn, 130 F. Supp. 2d 648, 653 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (noting
that “while Wolfe may have received some medical attention in prison, there is a fact question
as to whether Wolfe received any treatment for transsexualism” rather than just for depression,
lending credence to Wolfe’s deliberate indifference claim) (emphasis added).
166
See Norsworthy, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1117–18 (viewing skeptically “that after
Norsworthy’s treating psychologist explicitly recommended sex reassignment surgery,
Norsworthy was removed from his care and [a prison doctor with no experience treating trans
patients] was assigned to prepare a pretextual report recommending that sex reassignment
surgery be denied”). The court then allowed Michelle Norswrothy’s claim to proceed to
discovery, enabling further exploration of the defendant doctors’ and officials’ motives for
denying her care in the face of another doctor’s recommendation she receive surgery. Id. at
1118.
162
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treatment.167 Ashley Diamond, a transwoman incarcerated in Georgia,
challenged the Georgia Department of Corrections’ (“GDOC”) “freeze
frame” policy, which mandated care only for inmates identified as
transgender at intake or who had a “history” of receiving gender-affirming
care in the past.168 The GDOC rules are steeped in a conception of fixed
gender,169 but more importantly, the court was willing to question the
GDOC’s policies based on the prison’s outright denial of care.170 The policy
conflicted with elements of established care standards used by prison
psychologists which prescribed hormones as the necessary treatment for
Diamond’s diagnosis.171 Like Ophelia De’Lonta in Virginia, Ashley
Diamond got her claim past dismissal.172 Diamond succeeded by alleging
facts sufficient to show that
the Defendants knew the medically accepted and recognized gender dysphoria
treatment pursuant to the [WPATH] Standards of Care; knew about Diamond’s
diagnosis . . . and communicated with her directly about her gender dysphoria. But they
knowingly and repeatedly refused her requested treatment, refused to refer her for
treatment, and, at most, prescribed or authorized treatment—psychotropic drugs and
counseling—they knew was medically inadequate.173

In Diamond, medical staff could not skate by on court deference to their
own views of gender-affirming care or prison policies when facts are
presented that they were aware of external standards, at least at the pleading
stage.174 The potential result is that prison care guidelines do not always
167

131 F. Supp. 3d 1346, 1353 (M.D. Ga. 2015).
Id. at 1354. Diamond also alleged that the prison guards failed to protect her from
sexual assault while she was incarcerated, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 1353.
Because medical care, and not the additional serious problem of violence against transwomen
in prison, is the subject of this Note, I will not be focusing on the assault element of Ashley
Diamond’s case. It is worth noting that the court did not dismiss Diamond’s failure to protect
claim, nor did it grant qualified immunity to prison guards who failed to protect her from
assault behind bars. Id. at 1368–69, 1379–80.
169
See id. at 1353, 1354 (noting the prison’s policy assumed gender affirming care was
an on/off switch that was flipped at intake, and even if a person who had a previous diagnosis
and prescription for hormone therapy was locked up, that individual only received
“maintenance” level hormone therapy—not the level his/her/their condition medically
required).
170
Id. at 1354, 1372–73 (describing Diamond’s allegation that the GDOC’s “‘freezeframe policy[]’ prevented medical professionals from initiating treatment for gender
dysphoria” and taking as true that she was given care that was “medically inadequate
pursuant to the Standards of Care” instead of the GDOC policy).
171
See id. at 1356–57.
172
Id. at 1353.
173
Id. at 1373.
174
Id. at 1372–73 (holding that Ashley Diamond’s “allegations, taken as true,
sufficiently show the Defendants were subjectively aware of a substantial risk of serious
harm” when such allegations included “(1) all Defendants were aware of the medically
168
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override external medical standards. Plaintiffs who can show prison officials
have some awareness of external care standards may be able to attack the
standards used by the prison and force a shift toward more GNC-inclusive
care models.
C. A CASE THAT COULD WIN?

To get a court to let in medical opinion that restores some gender selfdetermination to GNC inmates, the incarcerated plaintiff must plead in such
a way that invites courts to adopt the closer scrutiny of official knowledge of
appropriate care deployed by the Kothmann, Norsworthy, Diamond,
De’Lonta, and Wolfe courts, instead of the reasonable prevention of risk
option to avoid liability championed in Kosilek and Rowe. A complaint
emphasizing the continued suffering of the plaintiff and presenting enough
facts to enable a court to infer that there are standards of care that would
alleviate such suffering may do the job of flipping emphasis from subjective
knowledge to something closer to objective reasonableness. Objective
reasonableness and a shift in focus to the real human prisoner provide a path
to challenge the subjective view of prison officials that their version of
treatment is good enough to dodge Eighth Amendment liability. For claims
facing summary judgment, emphasizing the holes the defendants left in the
record regarding the medical basis of their decisions a la De’Lonta I175 or
presenting facts enough to show officials were aware of multiple standards
of care as in Diamond176 are viable strategies to extend litigation into a stage
where Eighth Amendment subjectivity can further be eroded in favor of the
TGNC prisoners being denied care.
Norsworthy provides the best model. Michelle-Lael Norsworthy made
her successful claim by emphasizing not “that Defendants ‘should have
known’ that sex reassignment surgery was medically necessary . . . [but]
[r]ather . . . that Defendants were fully aware that Norsworthy faces a serious
medical need for sex reassignment surgery and failed to address her ongoing
accepted and recognized treatment for gender dysphoria pursuant to the Standards of Care,
which includes hormone therapy and gender expression; (2) all Defendants knew
psychotropic drugs and counseling alone were medically inadequate pursuant to the
Standards of Care . . .”).
175
See De’Lonta v. Angelone (De’Lonta I), 330 F.3d 630, 635 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding,
for example, that “nothing in the record suggests that [a prison doctor’s] opinion was a basis
for the denial of De’lonta’s requested treatment” based on the record presented by the
defendant officials).
176
See Diamond v. Owens, 131 F. Supp. 3d 1346, 1372–73 (M.D. Ga. 2015) (finding
that Diamond’s allegations, taken as true, did show from facts including her repeated suicide
attempts and medical history with a GD diagnosis that the “[d]efendants were aware of the
medically accepted and recognized treatment for gender dysphoria pursuant to the Standards
of Care” and yet denied Diamond such care).
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anguish.”177 This switch from what prison officials decide is a medical
necessity to their awareness of the prisoner’s suffering enabled Norsworthy
to get past the defense that there was merely a “disagreement between her
various caregivers” and thus no deliberate indifference since a course of
treatment that did not allow for gender-affirming surgery was chosen by
officials with multiple “legitimate” options.178 It may be troubling to goad
courts into action by requiring gruesome prisoner suffering before the Eighth
Amendment is met,179 but it returns the focus to the actual prisoner and gives
space to question standards of care and whether or not the standards prisons
use are actually working to prevent harm to inmates. Norsworthy then had
room to utilize the opinion of one caregiver who prescribed her the desired
treatment over the objections of prison officials180—officials who often
receive deference, as they did in Kosilek and Rowe. Norsworthy points to
officials’ subjective awareness that their preferred bare-bones treatment plans
were not reducing harm to the plaintiff as possibly being enough to make an
Eighth Amendment claim.181 A claim structured this way enables outside
medical opinion that disagrees with prison policy to become part of the case.
De’Lonta v. Angelone provides a useful template for Eighth Amendment
claims facing summary judgement.182 Ophelia De’Lonta’s eight-year quest

177

Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1117–18 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
Id. at 1118.
179
Farmer v. Brennan specifically aimed to foreclose such a requirement that the risk of
harm from denial of care became real harm under the Eighth Amendment: “Consistently
with this principle, a subjective approach to deliberate indifference does not require a
prisoner seeking ‘a remedy for unsafe conditions to await a tragic event such as an actual
assault before obtaining relief.’” 511 U.S. 825, 845 (1994) (internal citations omitted). For a
discussion of how requiring suffering from inmates before care will be mandated is
problematic, see Danielle Matricardi, Binary Imprisonment: Transgender Inmates Ensnared
Within the System and Confined to Assigned Gender, 67 MERCER L. REV. 707, 724 (2016)
(“Thus, jurisdictions that focus on gender dysphoria’s physical manifestations severely limit
redress for inmates with gender dysphoria who do not display drastic symptoms of suicide or
self-harm.”). The path this Note advocates does not require a catastrophic event like a
suicide attempt to occur before the claim can be litigated but moves to reemphasize the
perspective of the prisoner in shaping his/her/their own care. Id.
180
See Norsworthy, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1118 (finding that Norsworthy stated a claim for
deliberate indifference in part because she was pretextually removed by prison officials from
the care of a psychologist who recommended gender affirming surgery).
181
See id. at 1117–18 (holding Norsworthy’s complaint made a cognizable Eighth
Amendment claim because it “does not allege that Defendants ‘should have known’ that sex
reassignment surgery was medically necessary[, but r]ather, it alleges that Defendants were
fully aware that Norsworthy faces a serious medical need for sex reassignment surgery and
failed to address her ongoing anguish”).
182
See 330 F.3d 630, 631 (4th Cir. 2003) (“Because we conclude that it does not appear
beyond doubt that De’lonta cannot prove facts to support her claim, we reverse and remand
for further proceedings.”).
178
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to obtain hormones behind bars,183 which included “an injunction requiring
[the prison] to arrange for her to be treated by a doctor with expertise in
transsexualism,”184 inched forward—eventually to a settlement between
De’Lonta and the Virginia Department of Corrections (“VDOC”) whereby
De’Lonta would receive hormone therapy.185 In Ophelia De’Lonta’s case,
VDOC even consulted with a “an outside Gender Identity Specialist” to
provide De’Lonta the care she sought.186 VDOC’s officials let in new
medical standards following De’Lonta’s first victory in the Fourth
Circuit187—showing judicial deference to prison medical staff under the
Eighth Amendment framework is not above challenge. While procedurally
winning reversal of a summary judgement motion is not a win on the
merits,188 such a victory at the appellate level can be a powerful bargaining
chip for settlement as De’Lonta I shows. By emphasizing the lack of medical
expertise presented by prison officials in the record, the De’Lonta I court
enabled the plaintiff to fill the gaps left by the prison doctors, reassert her
identity, and eventually access a medical expert who actually met her needs.
While it is true that “[t]he medical model of the Eighth Amendment will
183

Id. at 632.
Id.
185
See De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 522 (4th Cir. 2013) (“The parties [in
De’Lonta I] subsequently reached a settlement in which VDOC acknowledged De’lonta’s
serious medical need and agreed to provide continuing treatment.”). In 2011, Ophelia
De’Lonta again sued VDOC officials for denying her gender-affirming surgery, and defeated
VDOC’s 12(b)(6) motion in the Fourth Circuit, in part because prison officials ignored the
WPATH Standards of Care’s recommendation that those suffering from GID have access to
surgery. See id. at 522–24. The Fourth Circuit also held that the district court erred because
VDOC providing some level of treatment did not mean VDOC officials met the burden of
the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 526. De’lonta v. Johnson reinforces the reasoning of its
predecessor De’Lonta v. Angelone, reapplying the same skepticism of VDOC officials’
medical decisions to again enable De’Lonta’s claim to move forward. The Ninth Circuit
also cited De’lonta v. Johnson in its reversal of a district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of a
transwoman’s Eighth Amendment claim. Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1040 (9th Cir.
2015) (citing De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 526 n.4 (4th Cir. 2013) (plaintiff not
required to point to medical opinion in her favor for her denial of care claim to be
plausible)). Rosati points to the viability of the De’Lonta I approach to more thoroughly
questioning prison medical expertise in Eighth Amendment cases across circuits. See 791
F.3d at 1040 (“Rosati plausibly alleges her symptoms . . . are so severe that prison officials
recklessly disregarded an excessive risk to her health by denying SRS [“sex reassignment
surgery”] solely on the recommendation of a physician’s assistant with no experience in
transgender medicine.”).
186
De’lonta, 708 F.3d at 522.
187
Id. at 526 (“Appellees [VDOC] have provided De’lonta with some treatment
consistent with the GID Standards of Care . . . .”).
188
See De’lonta I, 330 F.3d at 636 (explaining that in reversing summary judgment the
court “make[s] no comment on the merits of any issues not yet addressed by the district
court”).
184

BRIGHT

2017]

1/27/18 2:30 PM

NOW YOU SEE ME

169

always be somewhat in conflict with a conception of gender identity based
only on self-identification,”189 the current regime of prisoner/patient being fit
into a fixed binary checklist like that of the DSM-V190 can be shifted into a
model more like the UCSF’s, where the patient sets the checklist for the
doctor to fulfill.191 Getting those standards into the courtroom may be
possible where a court makes the inferential leap of Kothmann, uses a more
objective focus on official knowledge of gender-affirming care as in Wolfe,
or uses the suffering of the inmate as the litmus test for treatment as in
Norsworthy. It may also be possible when courts question the basis of
medical decisions in the record as in De’Lonta I, or when facts show that
officials knew what other care models are available as in Diamond. These
cases show that new care guidelines can make it behind bars when courts do
not let officials hide behind the Eighth Amendment’s subjective prong.
These cases present palatable ways to incorporate self-determination into
Eighth Amendment cases, with the hope that such care models erode fixed
binary conceptions of gender in the law generally, perhaps as a first push
away from legitimizing gender via medicine across the board. The other hope
is that prisoner-defined care will return the incarcerated individual’s
definition of self into the Eighth Amendment equation, thereby diluting the
current emphasis on expert and official viewpoints.192
CONCLUSION
In response to the pathologizing of TGNC persons via medical
diagnosis, “transgender activists and progressive psychiatrists have argued
that the diagnosis should be eliminated altogether and that transgender
individuals should be considered to be engaging in an act of selfdetermination, an exercise of autonomy.”193 An approach based on selfdetermination rather than external medical definition may also solve some of
the roadblocks put in front of GNC prisoners by expanding rights to care
beyond only cases where a prisoner seeks permanent transition. As Silpa
Maruri points out in the context of pathologizing trans status, “GID and its
relationship to the Eighth Amendment remains a complicated problem,
implicating the tension between the desire of transgender people to access
189

Halbach, supra note 34, at 482.
See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 58 at § 302.85 (listing factors for GD
diagnosis).
191
See UCSF, supra note 10, at 70 (“The approach to hormone therapy should be
guided by the person’s desired configuration of secondary sex characteristics.”).
192
See, e.g., Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 88–89 (1st Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub
nom. Kosilek v. O’Brien, 135 S. Ct. 2059, (2015) (finding error in the district court secondguessing prison medical expertise).
193
See Maruri, supra note 25, at 811.
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the means to achieve self-definition through transitioning and the
compromise of self-definition that transgender people must make by
accepting a GID di[a]gnosis [sic].”194 The same is true of GNC inmates who
may seek care by filing claims in courtrooms where a medical diagnosis
impliedly based in the binary is the only proven ticket to gender-affirming
care.195 GNC prisoners have to fit the GID/GD model of having a “gender
problem” to satisfy court notions of medical need and the many demands of
the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiffs must show that prison officials know of
(subjective intent and knowledge)196 and are thus “able” to treat the gender
“condition” (objective serious medical need)197 before that Section 1983
claim will hit its target. The kind of treatment officials can provide is
partially up for grabs depending on how a court deploys the Eighth
Amendment’s mean subjective barb.198 Once a court is willing to question
the treatment prisons provide (or deny), newer GNC-inclusive standards of
care can enter the scene.
As a step toward establishing a right to define one’s own gender,
medical diagnosis can be used as a tool to legitimize self-determined identity
even under the Eighth Amendment. Diagnoses pathologize TGNC
individuals, but litigated carefully, they are one way of chipping away at the
Eighth Amendment’s relentless emphasis on the subjectivity of prison
officials and erasure of those injured—the prisoners.

194

Id. at 821–22.
See Oparah, supra note 9, at 247 (“[B]y producing a class of individuals who have
been diagnosed with GID, and are undergoing or have completed SRS, the medical model
creates a hierarchy of transgendered people.” Because “the courts rely on evidence provided
by medical experts regarding the legitimacy of a transgender individual’s claim, those who
are not under a doctor’s care are excluded from legal protections.”).
196
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
197
See Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d 228, 244 (D. Mass. 2012) (“[I]t is well
established that GID may constitute a serious medical need.”).
198
For example, a plaintiff can beat the subjective requirement by relying on the
circumstantial evidence option of Farmer, which is an easier hurdle for plaintiffs to leap
since they do not have to delve into the defendants’ minds. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 842–43 (1994) (holding that circumstantial evidence of knowledge of harm or risk may
meet the subjective deliberate indifference requirement of the Eighth Amendment). The
Norsworthy court’s crediting of circumstantial evidence from Michelle Norsworthy’s
complaint is a prime example of the slippage of subjective intent into more easily proven
objective reasonableness based on surrounding facts: “The [complaint] does not allege that
there was a genuine difference of medical opinion; rather, it alleges that Defendants’
purported reliance on the opinions of non-specialized, inexperienced health care providers
was clearly unreasonable and pretextual and thus evidence of deliberate indifference.”
Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1116 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
195

